Example
Consider the game
| Ben | |||
|---|---|---|---|
Anna |
Help | Leave | |
| Help | 3, 2 | 0, 0 | |
| Leave | 0, 0 | 2, 1 | |
Anna can help or leave the village. Ben can also either help of leave a village attacked by zombies.
In equilibrium:
- Anna plays a best response to Ben's strategy.
- Ben plays a best response to Anna's strategy.
Here, they reach an equilibrium when they take the same action.
| Ben | |||
|---|---|---|---|
Anna |
Help | Leave | |
| Help | 2, 1 | 0, 0 | |
| Leave | 0, 0 | 3, 2 | |
(Help, Help) is an equilibrium. (Leave, Leave) is an equilibrium too!
Question
Consider the following payoff matrix:
| Ben | |||
|---|---|---|---|
Anna |
Help | Leave | |
| Help | 21, 37 | 78, 15 | |
| Leave | 88, -43 | -1, 97 | |
What is the equilibrium(s) of the game above?
This game does not have any Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium.